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Abstract— Recently, the concepts of game theory has attract 
the attention of researcher for self-governing decision making 
to study the performance of wireless network. There has been 
growing interest in accepting game theoretic method to wireless 
systems. The problem of interference management in femtocell 
network is approached from the prospective of game theory 
with the concept of price policy. Whereby price is used to 
control the power transmission of each femto users in the cell 
coverage. In this paper, we propose a price policy to reduce the 
effect of interference between the femto users at both center 
and edge regions of cell network. The performance of our 
proposed algorithm is demonstrated by simulation results. 
  
Index Terms—— Femtocells, Nash equilibrium, OFDDMA 
system, Interference.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE key feature of Orthogonal Frequency Division 
Multiple Access (OFDMA) systems is that it copes with              
severe channel condition without complex equalization 
fit [1], which can meet a variety of service requirements in 
the network systems. The access point of femtocell, which is 
deployed as Home evolved Node-B (HeNB) in 3GPP, are 
for connectivity of broadband to the operator core network, 
for cognitive facilities. Femtocell are aimed with cognitive 
functionalities for loading, capacity and coverage 
optimization, random access channel handover parameter 
and self- optimization to maintain quality of service with 
minimal intervention from the Mobile Operators [2]. With 
this motivation mentioned, this paper considers interference 
management in femtocell network, which consists of 
centralized Base Station and femtocell base stations. By 
integrating the cognitive capabilities into centralized 
approach under fractional frequency reuse and aiming to 
minimize the utility by using the unoccupied frequencies 
while minimizing interference to the primary base station in 
a spectrum overlay. The formulation of interference 
management in femtocell network with game-theoretic 
setting and using the Nash equilibrium as the balance 
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solutions of the formulated problem. Game-theoretic 
approaches to power control [3], [4], [5], [6] describe 
Quality of service (QoS) for the mobile station using utility 
functions. The idea of utility function is generally used in 
microeconomics and game theory to denote the level of 
agreement of a decision-maker with specific products or 
services as a result of its actions. Game theory is used to 
model interactions among self-interested users and predict 
their choice of strategies to optimize utility functions until a 
Nash equilibrium is reached, where no user can further 
increase its corresponding utility through individual action. 
Utility functions used for wireless systems relay on SIR and 
transmitted power of a given station. In [7], the authors 
provide some incentive for using game theory approach to 
study wireless network systems, and in particular power 
control. In [8] and [9], power control is modelled as a non-
cooperative game in which users choose their transmit 
powers in order to maximize their utilities, where utility is 
defined as the ratio of throughput to transmit power   
It’s more preferable to use the Nash equilibrium as the 
solution since it directly considers the ability of the players 
to coordinate their actions, which can lead to higher 
performance if each player behaves to act in selfish nature. 
One of the main focuses is how to mitigate interference from 
the multiple femtocell users at both regions of the cell 
coverage network so as to improve the system performance 
and quality of service in the networks. 
The model proposed in this paper is based on a simple game 
theoretical relationship between the base station at the center 
of the cell site coverage and femtocell base station with the 
concepts of price policy.  
The objective of this model is to monitors and fulfils the 
following aims; 
 The usage patterns of users that administers the 
necessary requirements for the quality of 
performance in the network. 
 The policy enhances the use of the common 
resources for reliable transmission. 
 The policy promotes fairness and quality of service 
among the network users. 
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. 
Interference management in femtocell network is explained 
in section II. Section III describes the theoretical approach 
of the system. Section IV analyses interference management 
with price policy and section V explain interference 
management without price policy. The performance 
evaluation are shown in section VI. Finally, we conclude our 
paper in section VII. 
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 II. INTERFERENCE MANAGEMENT IN FEMTOCELL NETWORK 
In this section, a base station is located at the Centre of 
heterogeneous cells with a number of femtocells randomly 
deployed by the home and offices users of the network. By 
integrating the cognitive capacities of femtocell base station, 
hence the base station occupied at the center is known as the 
primary base station and that of femtocell, known as the 
secondary base station in a spectrum overlay network.  Due 
to their self-behavior of each users of femtocell at each 
region of the cell coverage, the competition for the common 
license spectrum resource among the cognitive base stations 
can be formulated using a game-theoretic concept. The 
Figure 1 depicts a centralized base station with a number of 
femtocell base station randomly deployed with in an 
OFDMA network. This type of a network will be used in the 
simulations. 
 
 
  
Figure 1: A centralized base station with multiple 
femtocell base station 
 
III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The interference management in femtocell can be modeled 
using game theoretically approach with the concepts of price 
mechanism. In this paper, femtocell users is denoted as k = 
(1, 2 . . . J) who want to share the common license band with 
the primary base station. The price policy will enhance the 
usage of the common license band without interference 
between the femtocell users at the center and edge of the cell 
coverage. 
The total available band divided into sub channel denoted by 
∆f. The transmission power of their serving femtocell and 
neighboring femtocell Fi on subcarrier i, respectively are 
denote by ,f iP and ,iF iP the channel gain between the 
transmitting femtocell user k and the serving femtocell on 
subcarrier i , were indicate with 
, ,f F iG while 
, ,if F i
G corresponds to channel gain from the interfering 
neighboring femtocell 
iF . ,M iP  indicate the transmitting 
power of the neighboring macrocell M on subcarrier i . 
, ,f M iG  denote channel gain between femto user k and the 
neighboring macrocell M on subcarrier i . The utility 
function is denoted as ui, and the set of transmit power is 
represents as max{ : [0, ]}i i ip p p p  . Finally, 0N is the 
White Noise Power. The analysis of the performance was 
carried out in terms of signal to interference noise ratio 
(SINR) of both the regions of the cell coverage, and the 
utility function. The received SINR for the femtocell user 
thk located at the cell center region on a subcarrier i can be 
expressed as [10] 
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Where, Fi is the set of interfering femtocell. 
The path loss between a Femtocell user base station and UE 
in the same house is given by the following equation [10] 
 
, ( ) 38.46 20log10( ( ))f i wallsPL dB d m L              (2)                               
Where Lwalls is 7, 10 and 15 dB for light internal, internal 
and external walls respectively [11], so the channel gain is 
written as [10]  
 
            G = 10-PL/10                                                          (3)   
                                                                           
The capacity of the cell center is estimate in bits/s of a 
wireless system is expressed as [11] 
                                       
, ,.[log2(1 ) 1,...i centre f kC f k J                  (4) 
 
The capacity of cell edge user is estimate in bits/s of a 
wireless system is expressed as [11] 
 
 
, ,.[log2(1 ) 1,...i edge f kC f k J                 (5)                  
                                
Finally, the total network capacity is expressed in (bits/s); 
 
, , ,k Total k centre k edgeC C C                                             (6)                                                                                               
                                                                
Where   = 
1.5
( )In BER

 
 
Here we set BER to 10-6. 
 
Power has been one the resources used to suppress 
interference in the wireless system, by imposing cost on the 
power transmission whereby the signal of the femtocell user 
which are closer to the base station at the cell center will be 
controlled and it will not cause any unwanted interference to 
the entire network. We define our interference received at 
the user side mathematically; 
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From the SINR, we can formulate our power as; 
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IV. INTERFERENCE MANAGEMENT WITH PRICE POLICY 
The main aim of the section is to improve the signal levels of 
femtocells so as to avoid interference under fractional 
frequency re-use. Generally, this section aims to show how 
pricing within the femtocells can influence user’s behavior 
so that all users reach a Nash equilibrium state. This 
subsection defines a utility function to evaluate the overall 
system performance, based on SINR of all the users in the 
network. It is preferable to model the user's utility as 
concave increasing function of the user's SINR [12]-[13]. 
The best way for a user to maximize is utility function in a 
non-cooperative game, when transmitting with highest 
possible power, such that the level of interference in the 
network is increased and thus reducing the whole spectral 
efficiency rather than improving it. 
 
In order to control this, it is necessary to impose a price term 
(or cost) so that it prevents the users from always 
transmitting at full power. We aim to model utility functions 
which ensure optimal SINR so as to provide the best quality 
of service amongst the contending users of the base station. 
 
Mathematically the utility function can be expressed as in 
equation, for both center and edge region of the cell 
coverage in the equation below [11]  
 
, log2(1 ) ( )k centre k ku c p            (9)               
 
, log2(1 ) ( )k edge k ku c p                (10)                  
 
Where kc  is the price that determine the cost of power 
transmission, the user at the edge zone to transmit at the 
higher power due to their channel weakness and also to 
overcome the higher interference from the user at the cell 
center zone, the price for the zone should relatively low 
which promote fairness to the user at the edge zone. 
However, the user at the center zone experience strong 
channel and weak interference because they are closer to the 
base station. Therefore they should be restricted to transmit 
at the higher power so that they will not cause unnecessary 
interference to the whole system. The price must be 
relatively higher in value. 
In the problem above, the problem is to find the Nash 
equilibrium point from which both regions have incentive to 
deviate.   
 
Definition 1: the pure strategy solution for Nash 
Equilibrium (NE) for the proposed problem is when 
, ,i centre i edgeu u    constitutes the solution for the problem 
for the user at both regions, and then the point of NE is met. 
Hence, the Nash equilibrium is the solution of the game.  
 
Proof: it is notice here that the quality of service was 
improved and Nash equilibrium served has the solution to 
the interference in femtocell network.   
 
V. INTERFERENCE MANAGEMENT WITHOUT PRICE POLICY 
This section provide a game without price intervention, 
where the Base Station (BS) at the center is engaged with 
multiple femtocell users from both regions for the purpose of 
transmission. The femtocell users act independently and care 
only about them selves, they take into account each other’s 
potential decision, and the band used. This leads to 
interference and poor quality of service to network users, 
especially user that are far from the base station would suffer 
most. In this model, every user’s basic utility will be 
maximized, if a zero-price is applied to the user who want to 
access and share the frequency band (i.e. pi = 0) without any 
price term, then every femto user will transmit at the high 
power for their transmission of data in respect of your 
region.  We observed that each user is selfish and will utilize 
the frequency band without restraint, and the whole network 
user will try to maximize their usage so as to yield a 
maximum positive payoff.  
In a non- price intervention policy, user who want to share 
the license band will try to maximize its own utility. Thus, 
the utility function in game without price intervention is 
given as   
, log2(1 ) {1.... } (11)k centreu k j            
 
, log2(1 ) {1.... } (12)k edgeu k j                   
 
Theorem 1: The existence of NE at which is the solution to 
the problem at both region for the usage of frequency band 
at which the power of each user is set to its maximum value. 
This NE reduces the quality and performance of network. 
 
Proof: it can be observed here that each user of the cell 
network coverage will transmit at the high power in order to 
transmit their data to the base station and more so they will 
be dependent on themselves to improve the quality of 
service. The NE will cause too much interference and 
reduces quality performance of the whole networks for all 
users. 
 
Proposed algorithm for formulated problem: 
interference management in femtocell network. 
 
The proposed algorithm was used to simulate the formulated 
problem: interference management in femtocell network. 
The algorithm was run in MATLAB, where by resulting to 
Nash equilibrium point between the center and edge regions 
of the cell networks for the solutions. 
 
Generate_cell   % centre and edge region  
Generate_base station   % at the cell centre region  
Drop femto_user at both regions  
Calculate SINR at the centre region                          
Calculate SINR at the edge region                                         
Measure the utility function of centre region          
if  UCentre > Uedge  
update the price for the centre region .i.e. p+1, 
p+2,..P 
else if UCentre < Uedge    
update the price for the edge region   
else if UCentre  = Uedge    
 stop  
Nash equilibrium find 
end if  
end  
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
The simulation parameter that will be used for experiment 
are listed in table 1. The simulation analysis is basis on the 
mathematical implementation for performance evaluation 
and, however, the utility function of the femtocell user at the 
various regions of the cell coverage. The positions of 
femtocell users in the cell coverage area, and as well as other 
parameters enable us to calculate for transmitting power of 
the regions and signal, as well as interfere to which it affect 
the networks of the cell coverage. The price intervention to 
the power transmission to each users help to mitigate the 
interference in which that users would not transmit at the 
high power, especial those closer to the base station. Based 
on this estimation, we consider the White Additive Gaussian 
noise, to be able to make an assessment of the SINR and 
also the utility function. 
In this section, we present the numerical results and analysis 
to demonstrate the network performance of the system and 
the proposed algorithm. However, the bandwidth operates in 
30MHz band. The radius of femtocell user at the center 
region form the base station is 50m, while the radius of 
femtocell user at cell edge region from the base station is 
100m. 
The total bandwidth is denoted as ( )bandN , which is divided 
into sub-channel with amplitude of 15 kHz. The 
transmission powers of each region are differ in respect to 
their location. Transmission power for femto user at the 
center region is max,centreP 10dBm and transmission power for 
femto user at cell edge region is max,edgeP 25dBm. This 
allowed in order, to compensate their channel weakness and 
also to over the higher interference from the user at the 
center region.  
The white Additive Gaussian Noise of femto user at both 
regions is figures to be -174dBm/Hz. The price policy 
interference management is to promote fairness between the 
two regions where the femtocell user operate, whereby 
maximizing the power transmission through their utility 
function.  
Table 1: Simulation Parameter 
  
Cell Parameters  
Centre radius 50M 
Edge radius 100M 
Number of users 40 
Total bandwidth 30MHz 
Sub-carrier spacing 15Hz 
Path loss 38.46+20log10(d(m))+Lwalls 
Transmission power at 
edge 
25dB 
Transmission power at 
center 
10dB 
 
The main objective of our simulation was to find a point of 
Nash equilibrium of the utility function of each femto user at 
each regions of the cellular networks, where interference is 
mitigate and improve the network performance for both 
regions of the femtocell users. In order to mitigate 
interference, we simulate our proposed algorithm for 
formulated problem. The point of Nash equilibrium of each 
regions reduce the presence of interference. The results is 
portrayed in the following figures.  
 
Figure 2: Movements of femto users in the networks. 
 
 
   
 
Figure 3: Utility function of the users and their signal 
 
Figure 2 shows us how the femtocell user in each regions of 
the cell coverage moves around in the cell. Figure 3 
illustrate the utility function of the users at both regions of 
the cell coverage network, when the utility at the inner user 
decrease and the utility of at the outer user is constants. At 
this point, the present of interference still remain un-cancel 
between the regions due to high power transmitting at inner 
users at the center region. 
  
Figure 4: Show the movements of femto users in the 
network. 
  
Figure 5: Nash equilibrium of utility function and signal 
under number of users 
 
The Figure in 4 depict the movement of users in the 
coverage network.  These active users in each regions are 
show here. In Figure 5, the Nash equilibrium for both the 
utility function and signal is been achieved for the cell 
network. At this point, interference can be mitigate at the 
point of Nash equilibrium, where both regions can easily 
communicate without any interfering to each other. Their 
received signal power level of transmission are control with 
their utility functions, in order not to increase their 
transmitting power level to cause any interference between 
the regions. 
 
 
Figure 6: Users movement in the cell coverage. 
 
 
Figure 7: Nash equilibrium of utility function and signal 
under number of users 
 
In Figure 7, the equilibrium point of the utility function of 
the regions show that the received signal power at the outer 
users increase while at the center (inner users) reduced to 
have the Nash equilibrium and for healthier signal at both 
regions of the cell networks. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The aim is to mitigate interference in femtocell network 
between the cell coverage regions where users are located in 
the cell site coverage. Our technique is based on idea 
fractional frequency reuse with the concept of price policy, 
in order to minimize the transmitting power of the femto 
users at the cell center, so that there will not cause unwanted 
interference to the whole network. By applying the 
appropriate definition of utility function, it is possible to sign 
post the balance between the two regions of the cell 
coverage area of the networks for quality and capacity 
performance. This mechanism demonstrates a pure and 
unique Nash equilibrium as the solution of the formulated 
 problem. With the propose algorithm developed, allow for 
sharing and protection between the regions. 
The price policy brings fairness and quality of service within 
the regions of the cell site coverage. This proposed scheme 
is based on mathematically model for cellular system in such 
a way to minimize the interference in the network.  
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